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DEFAMATION OR DISPARAGEMENT
DEFAMATION OR DISPARAGEMENT?
By HARRY HIBSCHIMAN*
HE supreme court of Pennsylvania recently rendered a deci-
sion of epochal import holding that a broadcasting com-
pany is not liable for a defamatory statement interjected by a
person participating in a program produced by a sponsor to whom
the company's facilities and time have been leased, where the
company had exercised due care in the selection of the sponsor
and had no knowledge of the proposed or spontaneous defamatory
remark later broadcast.' After the verdict in this case had been
returned in the court below, the defendant filed a motion for a
new trial, which was heard before three judges of the court of
common pleas, and one of its contentions was that the alleged
defamatory remark, "That's a rotten hotel," related only to the
hotel and not to the owner. Of this contention the three judges
wrote: "In our opinion it is the veriest quibbling to argue that the
statement that a hotel is 'rotten' does not reflect upon the oper-
ators or management of the hotel."2
The supreme court did not find it necessary to pass on this
point but remarked that the contention had "much merit." Cer-
tainly the characterization of the argument as "the veriest quib-
bling" was wholly unjustified, for the question involved was of
vital importance in the case and far too serious to be dismissed in
such cavalier fashion. In fact it is a question that arises so often
in libel suits as to deserve special consideration.
In New York such a remark would clearly not be considered
defamatory of the owner but would be "libel on a place" only
and not actionable without an allegation and proof of special
damages.3
In the oldest and the most cited New York case4 the article
*fember Washington State and Illinois Bars; Staff Counsel Esquire
Magazine.
'Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Company, (Pa.
1939) 8 At. (2d) 302.
2Summit Hotel Company v. National Broadcasting Company, (C. P.
Allegheny Co. 1939).
aKennedy v. Publishing Company, (1886) 41 Hun 422, 3 N. Y. St.
Rep. 139; Bosi v. Herald Co., (1901) 33 Misc. Rep. 622, 68 N. Y. S. 898;
affirmed (1901) 58 App. Div. 619, 68 N. Y. S. 1134; Maglio v. New York
Herald Co., (1903) 83 App. Div. 44, 82 N. Y. S. 509; Maglio v. New York
Herald Co., (1904) 93 App. Div. 546, 87 N. Y. S. 927.
'Kennedy v. Publishing Co., (1886) 41 Hun 422, 3 N. Y. St. Rep. 139.
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sued on purported to give a description of various saloons at
Coney Island and of their frequenters. It did not mention the
plaintiff but was illustrated with a picture of the interior of his
saloon with the words, "In Kennedy's," underneath. Said the
court:
"There is nothing in the cut or picture itself reflecting on any
person. Taking the article in the strongest sense which it would
bear, with the aid of proper innuendo, it is a charge that the
saloons of which it speaks are the resort of improper characters
and the influences of association there are bad. It may be assumed
that it charges that the plaintiff's saloon is one of this character.
Granting all this, we think the libel is on the place and not on the
person. There is nothing in the article charging that the plaintiff
conducts his saloon improperly or that he is responsible for the
character of his guests.
"All that is alleged in the article may be true and without fault
on the part of the plaintiff. As the complaint avers no special
damages, we think it falls to state a good cause of action."
Virtually the same question was presented again in 1901,5
when the owner of a restaurant sued for libel because of a story
in a newspaper that lhis restaurant was a resort for anarchists,
that anarchists were in the habit of meeting there, and that a
dinner had been given there to one of the anarchist leaders. A
picture of the restaurant bearing the legend, "Resort Favored by
New York Anarchists," was published with the story by way of
illustration. Of this situation the court remarked:
"Examination of the publication fails to show any personal
reflection on the plaintiff in the conduct of his business or other-
wise, or responsibility on his part for the character of his guests.
The libel is on the plaintiff's place of business, not on himself;
and the rule in such cases is that the plaintiff has no cause of
action unless he alleges and proves that he has sustained special
damages as a necessary or natural consequence of the publication."5
In a somewhat similar case decided in 1903 the owner of a
hotel in Westchester County, New York, had brought suit because
of the following statement: "Further down on Lake Street is the
Roma Hotel, kept by Constantino Maglio. Many Italians make
the hotel their headquarters, and it has a bad reputation. .. ."
The appellate division for the second department, while sustaining
the sufficiency of the complaint on the ground that it contained
a proper allegation of special damages, said, in a per curiam
opinion:
5Bosi v. Herald Co., (1901) 33 Misc. Rep. 622, 68 N. Y. S. 898; affirm-
ed (1901) 58 App. Div. 619, 68 N. Y. S. 1134.
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"We agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the
alleged libel refers to the property of the plaintiffs and not to
the plaintiffs individually, and that it is, therefore, necessary to
allege special damages in order to maintain the action."'6
However, in a later case based virtually on the same charges,
the court held that the complaint did not state a cause of action,
since there was no allegation of special damages. "Without such
an allegation," said the court, "the complaint does not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action."7
SLANDER OF TITLE
While the New York courts are in the habit of speaking of a
"libel on the plaintiff's place of business," the cause of action
which they recognize under that expression was originally one for
slander of title, of which it was said long ago:
"The cause is denominated slander of title, by a sort of figure
of speech, in which the title is personified and made subject to
many of the rules applicable to personal slander, when the words
themselves are not actionable."8
Stating in a footnote that no comprehensive definition of this
species of tort had been found in any one decision, the editors
of the old American and English Encyclopedia of Law formulated
one in these words:
"Slander of title may be defined as a false and malicious state-
ment, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title
to real or personal property, or of some property right of his, and
causing him special damage."9
Odgers wrote of this branch of the law as follows:
"But there is a branch of the law (generally known by the
inappropriate but convenient name, slander of title) which permits
an action to be brought against anyone who maliciously decries the
plaintiff's goods or some other things belonging to him, and thereby
produces special damage to him. This is obviously no part of the-
law of defamation, for the plaintiff's reputation remains uninjured;
it is really an action on the case for maliciously acting in such a
way as to inflict loss upon the plaintiff."' 0
Then he added, "All the preceding rules dispensing with proof
of malice and special damage are, therefore, inapplicable to cases
GMaglio v. N. Y. Herald Co., first case, (1903) 83 App. Div. 44, 82
N. Y. S. 509.7 Mkaglio v. N. Y. Herald Co., second case, (1904) 93 App. Div. 546,
87 N. Y. S. 927.
sKendall v. Stone, (1851) 5 N. Y. 15.
OAm. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, (2d ed. 1903) 1074.
loOdgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed. 1929) 233-4.
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of this kind."" And that is an important distinction to bear in
mind.
That the gist of the action is damnum et injuria is similarly
recognized by Newell.' 2
DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY
The present-day tendency seems to be to discard the term
"Slander of Title" and to substitute the expression "Disparagement
of Property." This is what has been done in the Restatement of
the Law of Torts, where the topic "Disparagement" follows the
treatment of the subject of libel and slander.' 3
Comparing defamation and disparagement the introductory
note to the text proper says:
"In defamation, truth is a defense required to be proved by
the publisher as defendant. In disparagement, the person whose
property in goods or quality of those goods has been attacked must
prove that the disparaging statement of fact is untrue and that the
disparagement is incorrect. In defamation, the publication of all
libelous communications and of many types of slanderous com-
munications subjects the publisher to liability, even though no
pecuniary loss or other harm results therefrom. In disparage-
ment, the publisher is not liable unless the disparaging matter has
caused financial loss."
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This brings us to the specific question with which we are
concerned here: When and by what test do the courts hold that a
given statement constitutes defamation of the owner of property
and not merely disparagement of the property or vice versa? And
to answer that question one must turn to the decided cases.
A leading English case involved an advertisement cautioning
.the public that the plaintiff's "self acting tallow siphons or lubrica-
tors" wasted the tallow. The plaintiff sued for defamation but
averred no special damage. In the court's own words:
"This is not in effect a caution against the plaintiff as a trades-
man in the habit of selling goods which he knows to be bad; if it
were, it would be a libel on him personally; but it is a caution
against the goods, suggesting that the articles which the plaintiff
sells do not answer their purpose; which is not actionable unless
it were shown that the plaintiff by reason of the publication was
prevented from selling his goods to a particular person.'
4
"Idem.
12Newell, Slander and Libel, (4th ed. 1924) 196.
"Vol. 3, chap. 28.
14Evans v. Harlow, (1844) 5 Q. B. 624, 13 L. J. Q. B. 120.
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In an Australian case, a newspaper, of which the plaintiff was
the manager and part owner, erroneously published that two
different persons had won the same boat race. The defendant, a
competitor, commented, "According to the Market Street Ananias
both K and M won the boat race yesterday. Poor silly little
noozy." It was held that the word "Ananias" referred to the
paper and not to the plaintiff personally.'1
In a noted Massachusetts case the words complained of read
as follows:
"Probably never in the history of the ancient and honorable
artillery company was a more unsatisfactory dinner served than
that of Monday last. One would suppose from the elaborate bill
of fare that a sumptuous dinner would be furnished by the caterer,
Dooling, but instead a wretched dinner was served, and in such
a way that even hungry barbarians might object. The cigars
were simply vile, and the wines not much better."
The court held that the language, though somewhat strong,
amounted only to a condemnation of the dinner and its accom-
paniments. The charge in effect was simply that the plaintiff,
being a caterer, on a single occasion furnished a very poor dinner,
vile cigars and bad wine and was not actionable without proof
of special damages."'
A Washington case is notable for the reason that the plain-
tiff had been named specifically in the headline over, as well as
in the body of, the story alleged to be defamatory of him per-
sonally. The story related to food products-cheese, oranges,
herring-said to have been destroyed by the state department of
agriculture as unfit for food. The story was held not libelous
per se and not actionable without proof of special damages.
1 7
In a federal case that arose in Pennsylvania it was held that
it was not defamatory of the plaintiff company to publish that
an article manufactured by it was a "fraud ;" that an innuendo
undertaking to make the word "fraud" applicable to the plaintiff
itself was unjustified; and that the language used was not sus-
ceptible of the interpretation that the plaintiff was guilty of
fraudulent and dishonest practices. 18
'rAustralian Newspaper Co. v. Bennett, [1894] A. C. 284, 63 L. J. P. C.
105, 70 L. T. 597, 58 J. P. 604.
'ODooling v. Budget Pub. Co., (1887) 144 Mass. 258, 10 N. E. 809, 59
Am. Rep. 83.
"General Market Co. v. Post-Intelligencer Co., Inc., (1917) 96 Wash.
575, 165 Pac. 482.
'sNonpareil Cork Mfg. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., (E.D. Pa.
1901) 108 Fed. 721.
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In another federal case the defendant, a competitor of the
plaintiff, had published in its trae.e journal an analysis of a cattle
remedy produced and sold by the plaintiff. The analysis was said
to show that the remedy was worthless and composed of brown
sugar and bran. Commenting on what the analysis disclosed,
the defendant's publication used the words, "which only goes to
prove that P. T. Barnum's statement fifty years ago can be
applied even at the present time." Speaking specifically of this
statement that the American people like to be humbugged, the
court said:
"Can it be said that the article, without the aid of extrinsic evi-
dence, imputes to the plaintiff dishonest and fraudulent practices
which would necessarily result in pecuniary loss and damages to
the plaintiff? There is nothing in the article to show that such
a corporation as the plaintiff exists, or that the plaintiff is engaged
in the manufacture and sale of the remedy, or that the formula
is a secret formula known only to the plaintiff. These facts are
pleaded by way of inducement and are wholly extrinsic of
the article. Could it be said that this article would impute dis-
honesty to the owner of a drug store who sold Bowman's Remedy?
Manifestly not .... We conclude that, if we read Barnum's state-
ment into the article, it cannot be said from the article, standing
alone, without the aid of extrinsic facts and circumstances, that its
publication would directly and necessarily result in pecuniary
damage to the plaintiff."'"
In still another federal case a printed circular attacking the
use of benzol with gasoline was held not defamatory of the plain-
tiff, the only dealer in the community selling benzol-gasoline. In
a very complete opinion, in which the numerous English and
American cases dealing with the question were discussed, the
court concluded:
"The result of the above cited cases appears .to be that where
the publication on its face is directed against the goods or products
of a corporate vendor or manufacturer, it will not be held libelous
per se as to the corporation, unless by fair construction and with-
out the aid of extrinsic evidence it imputes to the corporation
fraud, deceit, dishonesty or reprehensible conduct in its business
in relation to said goods or products. '20
In an Iowa case the defendant had published an advertisement
to the effect that garments cleaned at half price were only half
cleaned, and reflecting generally on the quality of the work per-
l 9Erick Bowman Remedy Co., Inc., v. Jensen Salsberg Laboratories,
Inc., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1926) 17 F. (2d) 255, 52 A. L. R. 1187.
2ONational Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1927) 20 F. (2d) 763, 55 A. L. R. 406.
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formed at such rates. The plaintiff was the owner and operator
of the only establishment in the community doing such work at
half price, but the court ruled that it had no cause of action for
the reason that the statement in question failed to assail, or to
reflect upon, the character or integrity of the plaintiff company."
The rule to be discerned in these cases seems to be that a state-
ment is mere disparagement of property and not defamation of
the owner or manufacturer where it does not impute dishonesty,
fraud, lack of integrity or reprehensible conduct to such owner or
manufacturer in connection with the property, goods or product
referred to in the objectionable language, but constitutes defama-
tion when it ascribes such conduct to an owner. And there are a
number of cases in which this rule has been more specifically an-
nounced and applied. Thus it was held to be defamation and not
merely disparagement of property to charge that a tradesman sold
rotten or poisonous beef,22 that a tradesman sold damaged or second
quality shoes,22 that a stallion kept for breeding purposes was of
inferior pedigree,' that a painting sold by a dealer was not an
original but a copy,"- that milk sold to a cheese factory was
impure,2 that an insurance broker sold "fake" policies,27 and that
a butcher sold diseased meat.2s
In Texas and in the District of Columbia the distinction has
been made to hinge on the question whether or not the alleged
statement implied reprehensible conduct on the part of the owner
of the property regarding which the statement was made.2 9  In
Illinois it has been held that to charge that a given device is a
humbug imports want of integrity as to the maker and is libelous
per se.' And in one Missouri case it was held that to charge
that a certain journal was a "fake" was a libel of the manager
where he was named as its manager and publisher,3' while in
21Shaw Cleaners & Dyers v. Des Moines Dress Club, (1932) 215 Iowa1130, 245 N. W. 231, 86 A. L. R. 839.2Craig v. Pueblo Press Pub. Co., (1894) 5 Colo. App. 208, 37 Pac.
945.
-3Holmes v. Clisby, (1903) 118 Ga. 820, 45 S. E. 684.
"
4Henkel v. Schaub, (1893) 94 Mich. 542, 54 N. W. 293.
-'Freisinger v. Moore, (1900) 65 N. J. L. 286, 47 At. 432.
2GBrooks v. Harrison, (1883) 91 N. Y. 83.
-7Tobin v. Alfred M. Best Co., (1907) 120 App. Div. 387, 105 N. Y. S.
294.
-
8Leitz v. Hohman, (1901) 16 Pa. Super. 276.
'
9Young v. Kuhn, (1886) 71 Tex. 645, 9 S. W. 860; Marino v. Di-
Marco, (1914) 41 App. D. C. 76, 48 A. L. R. (N.S.) 1214, Am. Cas.
1914D 1149.
'
0Inland Printer Co. v. Economy Half Tone S. Co., (1901) 99 II.
App. 8.
Midland Publishing Co. v. Implement Trade Co., (1904) 108 Mo.
App. 223, 83 S. W. 298.
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another case in another court o:: appeals in that state, involving
a letter stating that a certain dusting powder for trees was
dangerous to use and unsatisfactory as to results, it was recognized
that the statement related to quality only and did not constitute
libel as to the manufacturer, the court saying:
"The distinction is clear. Had the article contained a charge
imputing wrong doing such as to affect its standing in the com-
mercial world, the publication would have constituted libel
per se." 3
2
In New York the rule laid down in the Kennedy and the Bosi
Cases was followed in several cases involving personal property.
In one it was charged that the Wall Street Journal was not a
general newspaper, so that the publication of a legal notice in it
would be null and void, and it was held that this did not constitute
libel of the publisher.3 3 In another the same rule was applied to
an article attacking a patent medicine.84 And in a third the alleged
libel consisted of a statement that the arms manufactured by the
plaintiff were of poor quality.3 5 Likewise following the Kennedy
and the Bosi Cases, th appellate division of the supreme court
for the first department held thai: words written of a theatre or a
play produced in that theatre were not libelous per se nor action-
able in the absence of an allegation of special damages in a suit
by the corporation producing the play.36
On the other hand, the owner of a factory shown in a moving
picture of the white slave traffic, with his name in clear sight, was
held to have a cause of action where the picture purported to
specify the factory as a place of assignation.37 The Kennedy and
the Bosi Cases were distinguished on the ground that the owners
of the places mentioned in the statements sued on in those cases
were not responsible for the conduct of their guests, but 'that the
factory owner was responsible for the actions of his employees.
The Kennedy Case was decided in 1886. In 1892 the supreme
court for the first department held in another case that to publish
of a given place by mistake that it was a disorderly house was
32Dust Sprayer Mfg. Co. v. Western Fruit Growers, (1907) 126 Mo.
App. 139, 103 S. W. 566.
3 3Le Massena v. Storm, (1901) 62 App. Div. 150, 70 N. Y. S. 882.34Hehmeyer v. Harper's Weekly Corp., (1915) 170 App. Div. 459,
156 N. Y. S. 98.
35Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, (1902) 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E.
163, 57 L. R. A. 310.36Adolph Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, (1914) 165 App.
Div. 377, 150 N. Y. S. 1044.
37Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., (1915) 166 App. Div.
376, 152 N. Y. S. 829.
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actionable per se. It was argued in behalf of the defendant that
this constituted libel of a place and not defamation of the owner,
but the court overruled that contention, though it cited no authori-
ties and made no reference to the Kennedy Case.8  The case was
not appealed and has been cited only once, in a memorandum
opinion.
However, in an Alabama case, where a newspaper had referred
to a certain house as bearing "a bad reputation," it was held, in
line with the preceding case, that an occupant of the house had a
good cause of action. Said the court:
"The house acquires whatever reputation it has from the
occupants thereof; it can make or earn none itself; it can and does
reflect only the reputation of its occupants or those who frequent
it. We know of no way that a house can, of its own act, acquire a
reputation. This being so, when we speak of a certain house as
being disorderly, we rmust necessarily be understood as referring
to the conduct of those who live in or frequent the same by and
with the permission of the occupants."39
In Louisiana it was held, on the contrary, that the owner of
an apartment house had no cause of action against one who called
the attention of the police to it as a place of suspicious character,
where the owner was not named nor designated as such.40  But
in a New Jersey case the owner of a Turkish bath was held to
have a good cause of action where the words complained of
charged that men in the place were permitted to peep at the
women while they were taking baths and to indulge in other
similar conduct. The question as to whether this constituted
defamation of a place rather than personal defamation was not
raised.4
1
The correct rule, then, to be deduced from the cases seems
to be that, where the alleged defamatory statement refers merely
to the quality or characteristics of either personal or real property,
or where it impugns the title of a party to such property, it con-
stitutes disparagement of property only and gives rise to a cause
of action solely if special damages are pleaded and shown, but
that, if the statement, either directly or by implication, ascribes
dishonesty, fraud, lack of integrity, or reprehensible conduct to the
88McClean v. New York Press Co., (1892) 64 Hun 649, 19 N. Y. S. 262.89Fitzpatrlck v. Age-Herald Co., (1913) 184 Ala. 510; 63 So. 980, 51
L. R. A. (N.S.) 401, Ann. Cas. 1916B 753.
54 Hyatt v. Lindner (1913) 133 La. 614, 63 So. 241, 48 L. R. A. (N.S.)
256.
'Kilpatrick v. Edge, (1913) 55 N. 3. L. 7, 88 At. 839.
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owner or manufacturer or seller of the property, it constitutes
personal defamation and gives rise to an action for libel.4 2
42 In addition to the cases discussed in the text, there is another that
needs to be noted, if for no other reason, because of the apparent confusion
of thought on the part of both the attorneys and the judges concerned in the
litigation. The case is one in which Paramount Pictures, Inc., sued in the
federal district court in Oklahoma to enjoin the publication and use of
advertising material for some of its pictures on the grounds that such ma-
terial violated the contract under which its pictures were released to the
exhibitors, that it omitted the name "Paramount," that its act constituted
unfair competition, that it violated the right of privacy of the plaintiff's
stars, and so on.
The district judge was unable to see where the facts shown entitled
the plaintiff to any relief. He found specifically that there was no violation
of contractual rights and no invasion of privacy. The court of appeals, on
the contrary, found that there was a violation of contractual obligations
and also that there was disparagement of property. The contentions re-
garding the invasion of the right of privacy it failed to mention.
As to disparagement it said "One without privilege so to do, has no
right to issue and publish an untrue or deceptive statement of fact which
has a disparaging effect upon the quality of -another's property, under
circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to foresee that it will
have such effect. The making of stch a statement in such instances is
tortious. Cf., Restatement of the Law of Torts, Section 626. And if the
statement is understood as one of disparagement and the understanding is
a reasonable construction of the language used, it is immaterial that the
person using it did not intend it to be understood in that manner. Restate-
ment, supra, Section 629. The allegations in the bill and admitted by
the answer bring the case within the ambit of that principle."
It is difficult to see how the facts recited in the two opinions, under
any construction that might be given them, presented a case for relief on
the ground of disparagement, especially in the light of the fact that no
special damages were pleaded.
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., (W.D. Okla. 1938)
24 F. Supp. 1004; (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1939) 106 Fed. (2d) 229.
